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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the existence of a duty owed by defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that
duty with (3) a resultant injury to the plaintiff, and (4) absence of contributory
negligence. 5 Failure to establish these elements will lead to the withdrawal of the
case from. fhe jury either by dismissal of the complaint0 or by directed verdict or
judgment notwithstanding the verdict,7 as appropriate.
In addition, the establishment of a jury question requires either a conflict in
the evidence or uncontested evidence from which fair-minded men might draw
more than one inference,8 a mere scintilla of evidence being insufficient for this
purpose.9 The test applied where a motion for directed verdict was involved was
whether the trier of facts could by any rational process find a verdict for the
party moved against on the basis of the evidence presented.' 0
In Rowland v. Parks," these elements of law were involved in relation to
the problem of the establishment of a prima facie case. In keeping with traditional
law on the subject, it was held that the case presented by the plaintiff showed a
12
mere scintilla of evidence and therefore did not merit submission to the jury.
Summary Judgment-Fact Question Precludes Use
A motion for summary judgment must be denied whenever the court
13
determines that there are triable issues of fact presented in the pleadings.
On this basis, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision in O'Dowd
v. American Surety Company of New York.' 4 They held that since an insurer's
contractual liability depended upon the facts surrounding the accident for which
liability compensation is claimed,' 5 those facts must be alleged and established
at trial.
5. Kimbar v. Estis, 1 N.Y.2d 399, 153 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1956); 6 BUFFALO L. REV.
228 (1956-57).
6. Ibid.
7. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT §457(a).
8. Veihelmann v. Manufacturers Safe Deposit Co., 303 N.Y. 526, 104 N.E.2d
888 (1952).
9.

FIFTEENTH ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL

COUNCIL OF THE STATE OF

NEW YORK. 1949. p. 250, states that:
Insufficient evidence as presently understood, does not mean
absolutely no evidence but evidence which is so slight as to
be in the eyes of the law no evidence; or, differently stated,
evidence which amounts to no more than a mere scintilla.
10. Blum v. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 292 N.Y. 241, 54 N.E.2d 809 (1944);
Wearever Upholstery & Furniture Corp. v. The Home Ins. Co., 286 App. Div.
93, 141 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Ist Dep't 1955).
11. 2 N.Y.2d 64, 156 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1956).
12. Previous notes concerning the requirements for a prima facie case are
found at 5 BUFFALO L. REV. 63 (1955-56) and 6 BUFFALO L. REV. 146 (1956-57).
13.

N. Y. R. Civ. PRAC. 113.

14. O'Dowd v. American Surety Co. of New York, 3 N.Y.2d 347, 165 N.Y.S.2d
458 (1957).
15. Stonbrough v. Preferred Accident Insurance Co., 292 N.Y. 154, 155, 54
N.E.2d 342, 343 (1944).
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The burden is upon the insured to establish that their claim for relief is
authorized by the terms of the policy.'> Since the insured did not properly allege
the necessary degree of tort liability, to establish a prima facie claim for breach
of the policy contract, his motion for summary judgment on the pleadings, must
fail for insufficiency.
Insured further contended that insurer is estopped from denying liability
under the policy because they undertook the defense of a prior action to
determine insured's tort liability under the original claim for damages.17 The
Court rejected this assertion by pointing out that the insurer had in fact given
notice of its intention to reserve claim before defending the action and was
therefore not estopped.'8
The Court had thus probed deeply into the facts surrounding a motion for
summary judgment on the pleadings. Although summary judgment is an
efficient, expedient measure to quickly eliminate ungrounded controversies from
today's overcrowded court calendars, it must be used with utmost care and
discretion. If this caution is not observed, we will open wide the dangerous door
to denial of due process, in the guise of judicial expediency.
Summary Judgment-Determnation Of The Nature Of The Action
In Erbe. v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Company,19 the plaintiffs brought an
action against the executor-trustee of a trust which had been concluded nine
years before, alleging certain wrongful acts of self-dealing which had taken place
more than ten years before this action. The plaintiffs had unsuccessfully alleged
bad faith on the part of the defendant in prior proceedings relating to the
termination of the trust but brought the present action alleging newly discovered
evidence of fraud, apparently resulting from a perusal of the Surrogate's Court
records pertaining to the trust.
The complaint was dismissed in Special Term2 0 on the grounds that the

action, though for damages in fraud, was precluded by the six year statute of
limitations2 ' since the plaintiffs had sufficient knowledge of the events at the
16. Lavine v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 260 N.Y. 339, 183
N.E. 897 (1933).
17. Moore Construction Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 293
N.Y. 119, 56 N.E.2d 74 (1944); Gerka v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York,
251 N.Y. 51, 57, 167 N.E.169, 170 (1929).
18. Moore Construction Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co. 293
N.Y. 119, 125, 56 N.E.2d 74, 76 (1944); Knauss Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North
America, 270 N.Y. 211, 215, 216, 200 N.E. 791-93 (1936).
19. 3 N.Y.2d 321, 165 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1957).
20." 1 Misc.2d 413, 145 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
21. N. Y. CIV. PRAC. AcT §48 (5).

